A California-based technology executive has been arrested in the United States for allegedly helping Iran obtain restricted American computer equipment for more than a decade, according to federal prosecutors. Authorities say that 63-year-old Jamshid Ghomi, a dual U.S.-Iranian citizen from Newport Coast, used the codeword "Motherland" in internal communications to refer to Iran while arranging shipments of networking, security and encryption equipment. Investigators believe the term was used by Ghomi and his associates to disguise the true destination of the technology and avoid drawing attention to transactions that allegedly violated US sanctions.Here’s what happenedFederal prosecutors accuse Ghomi of running a long-running scheme through his Tehran-based company, Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd. (FPR), to acquire American-made technology and send it to customers in Iran, including organizations linked to the country's military and nuclear programs. For more than a decade, Ghomi used FPR to procure U.S.-origin networking equipment for customers in Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions. At no time did Ghomi or FPR obtain a license from the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) authorizing those transactions.According to the official press release shared by U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California, Ghomi identified, negotiated, purchased, and arranged the shipment of large quantities of controlled U.S. technology for his own company. From 2011 to 2023, he used his own eBay and PayPal accounts to make hundreds of purchases of computer-networking equipment, directing the goods to intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2023, Ghomi personally negotiated the purchase of U.S.-origin networking equipment directly from suppliers in Minnesota and Nebraska, routing it through a UAE front company and on to FPR in Iran. None of these items could be lawfully exported to Iran without a license from OFAC.From 2014 to 2018, Ghomi arranged the smuggling of more than 250 metric tons (275.6 U.S. tons) of networking equipment into Iran, using freight forwarders and intermediaries in Dubai to disguise that Iran was the true destination.Ghomi knew this conduct was illegal and took deliberate steps to conceal it. He directed his UAE co-conspirators to keep his name off shipping paperwork, to omit invoices from shipments bound for Iran, and on at least two occasions to hide U.S.-origin computer equipment inside larger shipments. He used front companies in the UAE to obscure his role, and he personally received warnings on invoices and software licenses that exporting these goods to Iran was prohibited. Ghomi and his co-conspirators referred to Iran as “Motherland” in their internal correspondence concerning the equipment’s procurement.FPR’s annual sales exceeded $10 million, and its clientele included hundreds of Iranian companies and government entities, many of which were subject to U.S. sanctions. A relatively small but significant portion of that business went to the most sensitive end-users in Iran: the Iranian regime’s nuclear and military establishment.How the California-based techie supplied US-origin computer equipment to IranFrom 2017 to 2023, FPR supplied U.S.-origin computer networking equipment to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) – the Iranian government agency responsible for Iran’s nuclear program, including its centrifuge and uranium-enrichment programs. The U.S. State Department sanctioned AEOI in 2020 for playing a leading role in Iran's nonperformance of its nuclear commitments, including exceeding the limits on its uranium stockpile and enrichment levels. According to the affidavit, AEOI required FPR to register as an approved vendor, which it did in 2021 and 2022. From 2014 to 2022, FPR supplied U.S.-origin networking, security, and encryption equipment to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics — the Iranian ministry responsible for research, development, and manufacturing across Iran’s defense enterprise -- and to affiliated military and defense-electronics entities. FPR’s 2017 contract with Iran Computer Industries, signed by Ghomi, expressly identified the buyer as the “Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics — Iran Computer Industries.”Ghomi laundered the proceeds of his illegal business into the United States, depositing FPR’s Iranian sales revenue into its operating account at a sanctioned Iranian bank and then sweeping those funds to himself. Within days, he received matching wires into his U.S. accounts from a rotating set of unrelated trading companies and exchange houses in the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, Turkey, and the UAE. Those wires bore false descriptions such as “Buying Goods” and “For Consulting Fees.”From 2011 to 2024, Ghomi moved more than $15 million from Iran into his U.S. bank accounts and into a construction escrow account held on his behalf. He falsely reported those funds to the IRS as a foreign inheritance. Ghomi’s federal tax returns reported almost no income, his highest reported income in any year being $20,684. Ghomi claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit, a federal tax break for low- to moderate-income working individuals and families, in seven different tax years. Over the same period, Ghomi reported more than $1.7 million in home-mortgage interest and $1.25 million in state and local real-estate taxes on his federal income tax returns.Ghomi funded the construction of his Orange County mansion with the proceeds of his sanctions-evasion scheme. Ghomi purchased a vacant lot in Newport Coast in March 2010 for $4,490,000 and paid approximately $10,490,371 to construct the residence from 2010 to 2013. From May 2011 to August 2015, foreign-source wires totaling more than $7 million flowed into the escrow account funding the home’s construction. These wires came from many of the same trading companies as the transfers from FPR’s operating account, were handled by the same FPR employees, and bore the same false descriptions.