NE DELHI: The March 31 deadline indicated by home minister Amit Shah for the elimination of Left-wing extremism from the country may pass uneventfully, after having served its purpose of creating the right psychological mindset among all the stakeholders -- the Maoist leadership and cadres, security and police forces, local administration, political leadership of all affected states and the common people -- to focus on approaching and fulfilling a clearly-defined, common target.
Sources said even though the March 31deadline has dominated the discourse on Left-wing extremism for the past one-and-a-half years, the actual date is unlikely to see any victory processions or chest-thumping by the political leadership. At most, there may be references in future political speeches and public addresses by other dignitaries, especially during visits to the states once affected by LWE, to the govt having delivered on its promise to end Naxalism within the timeline indicated by it.
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"The purpose of the deadline was to set a definite time-goal for taking the fight against Naxalism to its logical conclusion, so that all the hands were on deck and the counter-Naxal machinery could work in mission mode, with time-bound planning of operations to decimate the leadership and the systematic launch and implementation of initiatives aimed at rehabilitating surrendered Maoists and rebuilding villages that for long had lived in fear of the gun," said a Central govt officer.
The results are there for all to see; the entire apex CPI(Maoist) leadership -- barring one politburo member, Misir Besra, and one key commander, Papa Rao -- have either been neutralised or have surrendered since announcement of the March 31 deadline. CPI(Maoist) is now no longer a cohesive unit but a loose bunch of Maoists hiding in the forests as minuscule, disjointed groups with no chain of command to look up to.
"The top CPI(Maoist) leaders and commanders themselves came forward to eschew the path of violence, leaving the cadres on the ground with no reason or motivation to continue leading a difficult life in the jungles with depleted manpower and arsenal. Obviously, the March 31 deadline created a psychological pressure on the Maoist leaders to decide between facing the bullets and taking the chance to lead a normal life with attractive incentives on offer for their rehabilitation and reintegration into the society. As their senior colleagues fell to bullets, the remaining politburo and central committee members started leaning towards the latter. The March 31 deadline surely played on their mind, even if sub-consciously, to make them exercise this choice sooner than later," P Sundarraj, Inspector General (Bastar range), Chhattisgarh police, told TOI.
For the security forces and administrative set up, the March 31 deadline painted a bull's eye. Knowing the time barrier well in advance helped the home ministry, intelligence agencies, Central forces and various state police shape their strategies accordingly, rather than working with an indefinite plan. "The target ensured that they worked in coordination to pinpoint location of the top leaders and initiate time-bound operations to corner them. There was no scope for letting down guard in between operations, with the home minister's deadline clearly in sight. This led to string of neutralisations of top leaders, keeping up the pressure on the those still on the run; ultimately, even top politburo members like Devuji and Sonu and many central committee members thought it wiser to surrender well within the deadline," a CRPF officer told TOI.
The common goal served as binding force for the affected states, notwithstanding the party in power. A healthy competition among the political leadership and the police of the states to prevail upon the Maoists to surrender within the March 31 deadline, resulted in attractive state-level surrender-cum-rehabilitation plans. The attractive rehabilitation avenues offered by these schemes leave little scope for the Maoists to return to violence.