Trade softly or you trade on his toes

The TOI correspondent from Washington: The apocryphal story goes that when a Bill Clinton envoy asked an Indian minister in early 1998 if New Delhi would conduct nuclear tests, he got the famous Indian headshake – the ambiguous 8-shaped nod that could mean yes or no or maybe. He took it as a no when his Indian interlocutor meant to convey maybe/yes, and that misunderstanding led to months of bad blood.

A similarly tricky act of interpretation now hangs over the US-India trade “deal” announced with considerable flourish by US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, but still short on detail, timelines, and legal text. The gap between Trump’s expansive claims on social media and the more cautious acknowledgment from the Indian side has left analysts describing the moment as a blend of substance and spectacle — “a mix of real movement and political theater,” as one trade watcher put it.




The first on-the-record clarification from Washington underlined that the agreement remains unfinished. US trade representative Jamieson Greer conceded that key elements are still being finalised. “We’ll finish papering it, but we know the specifics, we know the details,” Greer said, a formulation that suggested confidence without offering confirmation of several headline claims made by the President.

Greer confirmed that the US would retain an 18 percent tariff level on imports from India, while New Delhi had agreed to reduce duties on a range of agricultural products, medical devices, manufactured goods, and chemicals. Notably absent, however, was any endorsement of Trump’s assertion that India would slash tariffs and non-tariff barriers to “zero,” a promise that would represent a dramatic and politically sensitive shift for India.

Trump’s own announcement was striking less for what it said than for what it omitted. There were no timelines for India allegedly ending purchases of Russian oil, pivoting to American and “potentially” Venezuelan supplies, or ramping up imports of US energy, technology, agriculture, coal, and other goods to the tune of more than $500 billion. Trade analysts point out that India currently imports roughly $42 billion worth of US goods annually, making the headline figure achievable only over many years, not overnight.

“The pattern here is painfully familiar,” said Lena Petrova, a financial analyst. “Big numbers, sweeping promises, victory language first — and the fine print later, sometimes much later.” Others see geopolitical anxiety at work. Some commentators argue that Trump’s sudden enthusiasm was catalysed by India’s parallel progress on a free trade agreement with the European Union, prompting Washington to move quickly to avoid losing ground.

For now, both sides have material to claim success. Indian industry has welcomed the reduction of tariffs from a threatened 50 percent level to 18 percent, including the removal of an additional punitive levy linked to Russian oil purchases. Less remarked upon is that Indian exports had faced duties as low as 2–4 percent before Trump’s “Liberation day” tariff shock. Still, the new rate compares favourably with those imposed on several regional competitors, restoring some of India’s lost price advantage.

The regional ripple effects are already visible. In Pakistan, which had been celebrating a perceived opening in the U.S. basmati rice market, analysts have expressed frustration that India appears to have secured a better deal despite offering Trump no formal gestures such as a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. Modi, for his part, struck a warmly appreciative tone, praising Trump’s leadership and peace efforts — a diplomatic nod widely read as calibrated to the former businessman’s sensibilities.

That calibration may prove essential. Trump’s record shows that even signed and sealed trade agreements are not safe from reopening if they fall short of his expectations. South Korea offers a cautionary example. Despite a renegotiation of the KORUS free trade agreement during Trump’s first term, Seoul was again targeted in 2025 with “reciprocal tariffs” of up to 15 percent. A new strategic trade and investment deal followed, including massive Korean investment commitments. Yet within months, Trump publicly threatened to unravel it, citing delays in implementation.

The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which Trump himself championed as a replacement for NAFTA, has faced similar treatment. Ahead of its scheduled 2026 review, Washington imposed steep tariffs on Canada and Mexico in 2025, invoking border security and fentanyl concerns. The administration has since floated the idea of replacing binding trade rules with looser, adjustable frameworks — a move that would inject chronic uncertainty into North American commerce.

For New Delhi, the lesson is clear: the announced deal is a waypoint, not a destination. With a partner for whom trade is transactional, personal, and perpetually negotiable, India may need to tread softly — and quietly — ensuring that the real negotiations continue offstage, even as the public choreography plays out online.