'Russia using firms within India and other countries to launder weapons components', reiterates RUSI co-author

A sensational report published on April 22 by UK defence think-tank RUSI claims that there are a “myriad companies” in India and elsewhere, that act as via media and will take considerable risks to meet Russian requirements” of spare parts for its weaponry, despite the

West

’s ban on direct defence exports to Moscow. In an interview, Padma Rao Sundarji questions RUSI co-author

Nick Reynolds

on the report and the basis of its claims.
Q You write that there are ‘myriad companies’ in various countries including India, who “will take considerable risks to meet Russian supply requirements” of spare parts for the weaponry it has deployed in Ukraine, despite western sanctions against Moscow. There is stringent regulation of defence trade in India. Nothing can take place without official knowledge and sanction. Therefore, are you implying that the government of India itself, is in the know?

Reynolds: We’re not trying to suggest that any of those countries are supplying

Russia

with components. Rather, what we are suggesting is that Russia is using the markets and firms within those countries, including front companies, and third parties, to launder the components. So, I want to be very, very clear about that distinction.
Q. Your report clarifies that most of these components are manufactured in the West. But even Indian companies cannot import them without passing muster in various ways. An ‘end-user certificate’ is one such mandatory requirement. So, what proof do you have that companies in India are legally importing western-manufactured weapons spares, and re-exporting them onwards to Russia?

Reynolds: In terms of proof, a lot of proof is from the examination of the weapons themselves. We can clearly see that the majority of these components are foreign-manufactured. In terms of how these components have been laundered, we’ve spoken with the Ukrainian government and their intelligence sources track Russian activity quite closely. It’s our assessment that Russia has been using its intelligence agencies to set up front companies in these different areas and using those to source components quite widely.

Q: “Restricting access, therefore, likely means preventing export to countries such as India of goods that are in some instances used for civilian purposes.” That’s another excerpt from your report. Are you recommending western sanctions on India too?

Reynolds: Not necessarily. I think it’s an area where collaborating with India to determine how these components have been sourced, given the indications, is very very important. In terms of components restrictions, that would be quite an extreme measure, especially given the globalized nature of supply chains, and the fact that a lot of these components do have commercial use. You are asking me whether we are suggesting we should cut India off from the market? That’s impractical, unhelpful and not fair on Indian companies, who are doing commercial business in “good faith” and unconnected to the matter involving these components. The important thing is, therefore, to understand how the network of front companies, and how the network of laundering happens. If there are instances of companies knowingly aiding and abetting the Russian government in sourcing components, let’s identify them. If there are people working within institutions who are either corrupt or have been compromised and are therefore collaborating, identify them. This is exactly why we need to focus on it. Because otherwise, the alternative is very broad-based, very costly, damaging and an unfair cutting off of trade.

Q: Your report claims: “Although Russian weapons are full of Western manufactured components, it is not clear that the companies manufacturing them, knew that the Russian military was the end-user”. The Russian weaponry in use in Ukraine at present was certainly not assembled overnight. Before the Ukraine invasion and the imposition of western sanctions, there was a flourishing and legal defence trade between Russia and the West. The parts Russia is now seeking to replace through third parties in countries like India, as your report implies, continue to be manufactured in, and exported by, the very same western companies. Why doesn’t your report expose, and suggest stopping those companies instead?

Reynolds: The systems involved are largely made of foreign components, at least when it comes to electronics. We are fundamentally not talking about Indian components, we are talking about British, American, Dutch, South Korean, and German components. There is very very broad culpability in this. And I certainly wouldn’t want to suggest that we are pointing a finger at India in particular. To expand on the above, I should add that other countries from where components were sourced include

Japan

and Taiwan, among others. It is very difficult to untangle and conclusively verify exactly which companies have been complicit in sourcing electronic components, and which companies have been unknowingly used. So it would be inappropriate for the report's authors to name them at this time.