Maligning woman’s character a form of social violence: Kerala HC

Kochi: High court has recently observed that maligning the character of a woman without any foundation or substance is a pernicious form of social violence. While such allegations are easily uttered, the stigma they leave behind is often indelible.A bench comprising Justice C S Dias made these observations while quashing a case registered at the Ernakulam Central police station against actor Shwetha Menon, who is also the president of the Association of Malayalam Movie Artists (AMMA). The case was based on a private complaint filed before the chief judicial magistrate court, Ernakulam. The complaint alleged that Menon acted in a vulgar and nude manner in films and advertisements and uploaded such content to pornographic websites and social media platforms. It further alleged that she circulated pornographic videos involving minor girls and participated in sex marketing.The court observed that when a woman attains name, fame and recognition in public life, attempts to challenge her on the basis of reason, logic or merit may become difficult. In such situations, social shaming is often deployed as a weapon. When a society focuses more on a woman's image than on her achievements, it exposes its own intellectual poverty. Progressive societies evaluate individuals based on their actions and contributions, whereas regressive societies resort to slander, character assassination and moral policing. The empowerment of women does not mean elevating them to sainthood, but recognising their individuality, aspirations and accomplishments with dignity and fairness. A society that tolerates the vilification of a woman out of envy or malice is an embodiment of injustice, the court added.The court further noted that the complaint against Menon contained only a vague and bald allegation that the petitioner was involved in ‘sex marketing.' Such a sweeping and unsubstantiated claim, devoid of any material or prima facie evidence, was held insufficient to attract offences under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. Similarly, there was no allegation that Menon had published or transmitted any material in electronic form containing sexually explicit acts. The court also noted that no statutory authority had objected to the films or advertisements of the petitioner on the ground that they contained sexually explicit content. Accordingly, the court quashed the case.