Unreliable guarantees: With US-Iran ceasefire on the horizon, will we see a new order in the Gulf?

As Washington and Tehran edge closer to what could become a broader ceasefire agreement, Gulf states are confronting an uncomfortable question: can the region continue relying on outside powers for security, or has the war exposed the limits of American guarantees?US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said a deal between the United States and Iran could come “within hours”, while Donald Trump claimed a framework had already been “largely negotiated”. The proposed arrangement could reopen the Strait of Hormuz, ease some sanctions on Tehran and temporarily halt one of the most dangerous regional conflicts in decades. Yet for the Gulf monarchies caught in the middle of the war, the ceasefire has not brought reassurance. Instead, it has deepened anxieties about their long-term security. Also read: From Hormuz to nuclear talks - what to expect in the 60-day US-Iran ceasefire proposalThe conflict demonstrated how vulnerable Gulf states remain despite decades of military partnerships with Washington. Iranian missiles, drones and proxy attacks targeted ports, oil facilities and critical infrastructure across the region. Even countries that were not formally part of the war found themselves under attack. The UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant was targeted by drones allegedly launched by Iran-backed militias in Iraq, while Saudi and Emirati infrastructure came under repeated strikes.At the same time, Gulf leaders have quietly urged Trump not to restart military action against Iran. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are all pushing for diplomacy, fearing that another round of war could devastate regional economies and permanently damage the Gulf’s image as a stable global energy and investment hub.A recent essay in Foreign Affairs by Middle East argues that the war has exposed the failure of the Gulf’s long-standing security model.For decades, Gulf monarchies outsourced their security to Western powers, particularly the United States. Massive American military bases across Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were seen as insurance against Iran. But Roberts argues the war turned those very alliances into liabilities.Also read: UAE spooked? Fearing Gulf chaos, Abu Dhabi joins Saudis, Qatar in urging Trump against fresh Iran war“The American forces they host have become the main reason their hotels and energy infrastructure are under Iranian attack,” wrote scholar David B. Roberts.Roberts contends that Gulf states should no longer “buy” security from foreign powers but instead build their own regional order through direct engagement with Iran, coupled with stronger indigenous military capabilities.His proposal:Despite the destruction, Gulf states are now prioritising de-escalation over confrontation.According to reports, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani all urged Trump not to resume attacks on Iran. Pakistan has emerged as a key mediator, facilitating indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran.But Gulf states remain deeply wary of Tehran’s intentions.An analysis published by the Gulf International Forum argued that Iran’s attacks shattered years of Gulf efforts to moderate Iranian behaviour through diplomacy, including the China-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement of 2023.The report said Tehran’s decision to target Gulf infrastructure despite the GCC states not being direct combatants revived old perceptions of Iran as a permanent regional threat.“The Gulf Arab states saw their worst fears come true,” analyst Dina Esfandiary said. “They were caught in the middle of a US-Iran war and suffered much of the fallout.”Even as diplomacy advances, Gulf states are trying to strengthen maritime security and ensure Iran cannot again disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of global oil supplies pass.The war has also exposed growing fractures within the Gulf Cooperation Council itself.Saudi Arabia and Qatar have strongly backed diplomacy and de-escalation. Riyadh, mindful of its religious and political position in the Arab world, wants to avoid any perception of openly aligning with Israel against Iran. Saudi leaders also fear that escalation could draw Yemen’s Houthis deeper into the conflict and threaten Red Sea export routes.The UAE, however, has increasingly pursued a more confrontational strategy. According to multiple reports, Abu Dhabi coordinated limited retaliatory strikes against Iran with the United States and Israel during the war. The UAE also reportedly received Israeli-made Iron Dome systems and pushed for tougher military measures to secure the Strait of Hormuz.The divergence reflects a broader strategic split between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that now extends across Yemen, Sudan, Gaza, energy policy and relations with political Islamist movements.The UAE’s decision to leave OPEC earlier this year further highlighted the growing tensions. At the same time, Abu Dhabi accelerated work on alternative oil export pipelines bypassing Hormuz, signalling its belief that future instability with Iran may be unavoidable.Another practical obstacle to regional self-reliance is capability mismatch. While Gulf states have increased defence spending and acquired advanced kit, integrating air, naval and missile-defence systems into a cohesive, region-wide architecture will be technically and politically difficult. Interoperability gaps, differing procurement sources, and opaque command arrangements mean that hardware alone won’t deliver credible deterrence; effective joint operations require shared doctrine, real-time intelligence sharing, and regular combined training—areas where trust still lags.Economic interdependence with external actors also constrains strategic autonomy.Gulf economies remain deeply integrated with Western financial systems, technology providers, and security contractors. Moving away from American guarantees therefore carries transaction costs: insurance premiums for shipping could spike, foreign investment flows could slow, and access to advanced military platforms and spare parts might be constrained if ties fray. These economic levers give outside powers continued influence over Gulf choices even as political leaders speak publicly of diversification.Domestic politics complicate regional arrangements as well. Rulers across the Gulf must balance elite consensus, tribal considerations, and public sentiment; a poorly managed shift toward either confrontation or alliance with Iran could provoke internal unrest or erode regime legitimacy. That incentive structure pushes many capitals toward cautious hedging—pursuing incremental capability-building and behind-the-scenes diplomacy rather than abrupt, visible realignments that could be sold domestically as capitulation or recklessness.Finally, any durable Gulf security architecture will likely require explicit buy-in from middle powers outside the region—Turkey, Pakistan, India—and institutional mechanisms for dispute resolution and verification. Without credible third-party guarantees and monitoring, confidence-building measures will struggle to stick. Ironically, then, the region’s path to greater autonomy may still depend on managed, limited engagement with outside powers—less as custodians of security and more as guarantors and technical partners in a Gulf-led framework.For now, the ceasefire remains fragile. Iran-backed militias in Iraq continue to threaten Gulf infrastructure, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly warned that military action against Tehran may resume if diplomacy fails.Yet the war may already have transformed Gulf strategic thinking.The central argument made in Foreign Affairs is that Gulf states can no longer depend indefinitely on external protection. Whether through diplomacy with Iran, expanded regional defence cooperation or investment in their own military capabilities, the Gulf may now be entering a period where it seeks greater strategic autonomy. The challenge is that the region remains deeply divided over what that autonomy should look like.Saudi Arabia still sees value in cautious diplomacy. The UAE increasingly views Iran as an existential threat that can only be managed through deterrence and pressure. Qatar continues to favour mediation. Oman remains the region’s quiet intermediary.The result is a Gulf caught between two realities: the old American security umbrella appears less reliable than before, but no clear regional alternative has yet emerged.