Why India must plan for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan

A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace throws light on how China increasingly uses the ‘One China’ principle to frame the policies of other countries towards the Taiwan question. By asserting that this principle is globally accepted, China tries to establish a sense of legitimacy and a seemingly moral high ground from where it can pressurise others to bend to its view that whatever happens with Taiwan is a purely bilateral matter that should not be the concern of other parties.The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) objective is to eliminate the possibility of any external involvement in how China chooses to reunify with Taiwan, by making others, including India, feel that such action is inconsistent with their own policy. However, in the 1950s, India had separated the sovereignty question from that of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.Watch: China ups the ante with military drills medium nocaption99337372So far as the latter was concerned, Jawaharlal Nehru made it quite clear, by word and deed, that “when a problem or a decision [in the Taiwan Strait] may lead to war or peace, a war that may extend all over the world, then it ceases to be a local or even a continental problem — it is a world problem”.The policy of “what happens in the Taiwan Strait is India’s business” was thus clearly established. This policy remains relevant in today’s context because the implications of tension or conflict in the Taiwan Strait are likely to be significantly more detrimental to Indian national security.China can be expected to exert considerable pressure to dissuade Indian activism during periods of tension in the Taiwan Strait. It will possibly argue that, aside from the ‘One China’ principle, India is not even part of the ‘region’ in which the Taiwan Strait is located and that it is therefore not a matter for India to be concerned with.However, the PRC has regularly weighed in on tense situations in South Asia and the northern Indian Ocean regions, by claiming that tension between India and other neighbours affects regional stability and therefore is a matter of legitimate concern for other countries, including China. medium99586062By the same token, India has good reason to express concern and take diplomatic action when cross-strait tensions threaten to disturb regional peace and security. For several decades, India had imposed self-censorship as part of its overall China policy. This seems to have changed when, on August 12, 2022, India expressed concern about developments in the Taiwan Strait after China began military manoeuvres following US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi’s decision to visit Taiwan.This statement was balanced and urged all parties towards “exercise of restraint, avoidance of unilateral actions to change the status quo, de-escalation of tensions and efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region”. India should henceforth continue to articulate concerns about destabilising behaviour by the involved parties in the Taiwan Strait in a consistent and credible way.Assessing the risksGiven the salience of the Taiwan question from both the domestic socioeconomic as well as national security perspectives, it is not enough that the Taiwan Strait should be resituated as an important factor in India’s foreign policymaking.A detailed study of internal developments (including the possibility of a change in government in Taiwan in 2024), cross-strait exchanges between the PRC and Taiwan, and the triangular dynamics between the PRC, the US and Taiwan is required without delay. The National Security Council secretariat could be tasked to develop a whole-of-government assessment of both the risks and the mitigating policies that will minimise the direct and indirect impact of a Taiwan crisis on the Indian economy. medium99586157On the basis of such an assessment, the Indian government could develop contingency planning as well as identify ‘red flags’ that might trigger the implementation of such plans. The potential consequences for India, in case its domestic economy is unprepared for the blow, will be far more widespread than the impact of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.If a crisis begins to develop, India may have to decide what sort of diplomatic action to take in the interests of preserving regional peace and security. In the 1950s, the government’s strategic vision of the importance of maintaining regional peace, because it was in India’s fundamental interest to do so, was correct. However, the conflicting objectives between acting in self-interest and, on the other hand, doing what was right or ethical, led India to adopt a confused policy.This error was compounded by the mixing of the national agenda with the personal agenda of VK Krishna Menon, who was the face of Indian diplomacy during both the Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s.If, in the 1950s, there were good reasons to believe that China would become a partner in the Asia-Pacific, and that India’s good relations with both the PRC and the US placed it favourably to act as a diplomatic go-between, this is no longer the situation in the 2020s. India has a multifaceted and strategic partnership with the US. On the other hand, the PRC does not see India as ‘neutral’ but as having tilted towards the Americans. medium99586215Since Beijing talks of judging others by their deeds, China’s actions since 2017, including its activities along the entire Line of Actual Control (LAC) and its recent significant augmentation of military force levels close to the border areas as well as other indicators including the prolonged absence of a replacement for the previous Chinese ambassador in New Delhi (who left in October 2022), suggest that China considers India to be biased and problematic.In such circumstances, the possibility of adopting diplomatic action to help the two main parties in resolving a future crisis is neither practical nor feasible. India’s national interest is to avert tension and prevent disruption of peace in the Taiwan Strait. It might craft a set of diplomatic actions that, singly or in combination, help India to pursue that objective.As the crisis unfoldsTo what extent Indian actions are coordinated with its partners will be decided by policymakers depending on the shape and circumstances of an actual crisis in the Taiwan Strait. A recent assessment by a prominent American think tank has opined that India, along with Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand, “would be concerned about Chinese encroachment but also fear Chinese power. They would be sympathetic to the US and Taiwan but reluctant to expose themselves to a Chinese attack. Thus, they would take a passive approach, allowing US overflight and transit but not participating themselves or allowing operations from their territory”. medium99586272A recent European assessment released at the Munich Security Conference 2023 has similarly omitted any reference to India in the context of regional deterrence building against the PRC’s aggressive behaviour towards Taiwan. Such assessments suggest that the rest of the world is not clear about India’s course of action if a crisis breaks out in the strait. It is important that India’s partners have clarity on this matter so that there is no misreading of its position.This, first and foremost, requires a mapping of the expectations of the two principal players and the actions they would anticipate from India.So far as the PRC is concerned, it would prefer that India remains ‘neutral’, but it would presume that the latter is likely to ‘tilt’ towards the US. Its actions might, thus, be with the intention to deter this tilt or to minimise the possible threat of a second front. This could take the form of posturing (massive force build-up or nuclear weapons targeting), aggressive behaviour along the LAC (either singly or with Pakistan), or, in a more extreme case, a limited punitive strike.On the basis of scenario-building, Indian strategists need to develop a set of responses on an escalatory ladder in case China follows such a course of action. This will have to be done bearing in mind that the asymmetry between India and China will not change in the near future either in terms of comprehensive national strength or in terms of border infrastructure, and hence India has to prepare for increased border tensions if China feels that grey-zone warfare is the appropriate form of deterrence to stop India from helping the US in the next Taiwan Strait crisis. medium99586285An important lesson of the 1950s that is worth recalling is that China is equally anxious about a multifront conflict. India should remind China that the latter is vulnerable too. China cannot be allowed to absolve itself of responsibility by placing the burden of conflict along China’s southwestern border only on India simply in order to deter the Indian tilt towards the US.If India’s national interests are directly threatened, all options should be available. However, this is a case in extremis. The overarching objective should be to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and every effort must be made by India to prevent the possibility of conflict in any form without closing any options.How much is too much?The US assumes that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would put India in a dilemma. On the one hand, India would be wary of the strengthening of China’s position, which might result from a conquest of Taiwan, and would have reasons to be friendly with the US. On the other hand, India would also be alert to the dangers that would result from participation. It is unlikely that India would take active part (except if directly threatened) if a conflict were to arise, but the US would still expect some Indian support during the same.A Center for Strategic and International Studies paper makes the key point that, unlike in the case of Ukraine, the US will neither be able to preposition significant forces in Taiwan, nor will they be able to land troops or significantly augment supplies and war material once the conflict begins. This means that the US will have to put all their logistical and basing arrangements in place before the conflict. medium99586250The report postulates that initial Chinese missile strikes may destroy much of the US’ forward-deployed aircraft and naval strength. This makes prewar deployments that are geographically less vulnerable to Chinese strike capabilities critical to the US war effort. It is not unreasonable to assume that the US will ask for logistical assistance from India, possibly including the use of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.These could be seen as red flags by the PRC. India needs to have a clear view of what to do in a pre-conflict situation where the US might be climbing the escalatory ladder as well as during a conflict when Washington makes demands of New Delhi. This requires a proper understanding of the US’ objectives, strategy and strategic expectations.For these reasons, the Taiwan Strait issue should be put on the agenda in all consultations with key partners. India will inevitably have differences with its partners on the risks and benefits of confronting China, but a clear idea, during peacetime and not as the crisis unfolds, of the points of convergence and divergence and of its partners’ expectations will provide the vital inputs that will facilitate advance preparations for contingencies in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Closer coordination and liaison arrangements ought to be built into the partnerships.Excerpted with permission from Carnegie India. Read the full report here.