India's low intelligence quotient

Madhuri Gupta, recently arrested on charges of spying for Pakistan, should have disappeared quietly into the annals of Indian intelligence operations as a black sheep but for the unprecedented publicity her story got. In complete defiance of norms that govern such sensitive cases, Gupta’s photographs were splashed all over along with details of her activities, contacts and friends including the name of the R&AW (Research and Analysis Wing) station head in Islamabad.
It was a stunning self-goal . For the first time, there was public mention of the presence of intelligence operatives in our mission across the border and the Pakistani media pounced on it with glee. A leading Pakistani daily, Dawn, accused India of violating the Geneva Convention by posting spies disguised as diplomats.
Former intelligence officers are shocked at the way classified information has been bandied around in public ever since the Madhuri Gupta case exploded . “We normally don’t talk about such things,’’ said former R&AW chief Vikram Sood. “I am surprised by the hype surrounding this case. We are making a spectacle of ourselves in front of the world.’’
The implications of this colossal blunder are beginning to dawn and the government is now scrambling to control the damage. But it may be a case of trying to close the stable door after the horses have bolted. The “outing” of the R&AW officer’s name has not only rendered him ineffectual in an important post, it may also have cut short his career in the agency, robbing it of an experienced officer whose field work in Pakistan was critical value addition.
The episode has left a trail of unanswered questions . Was Madhuri Gupta a double agent, our very own David Headley? Or was she framed, as she has claimed in court, a victim of a deadly spy versus spy game that spun out of control? We may never know but the drama of the past two weeks has aroused suspicions of a murky tribal war within the intelligence set-up . Says former high commissioner to Pakistan, G Parthasarthi, “The leaks (about Madhuri Gupta) were unseemly and unnecessary. They’ve left a clear impression that this was a case of IB and R&AW trying to settle scores with each other. What is shocking is the lack of oversight on the wanton leakage of information about Gupta. The cabinet secretariat and the home ministry should have been more alert.’’
Now that the genie is out of the bottle, there are stories a-plenty about lax mission security, especially in Islamabad. Two years ago, for instance, the then high commissioner’s personal computer was stolen from his heavily guarded residence. The case was hushed up and till today no-one knows how the robbery occurred or who the thief was.
Last year, a police officer posted by IB to look after the security of the mission in Islamabad had to be recalled because he was suspected to have been compromised. He is now on study leave pending the results of a departmental inquiry. The home ministry sent a probe team to Pakistan for a thorough investigation. Ironically, the team failed to zoom in on Madhuri Gupta although she was probably already in the thick of her allegedly nefarious activities by then. Apart from this, there have been sundry cases of lower staff members like security guards and clerks caught making unauthorised contacts with Pakistani intelligence.
At the best of times, Islamabad is a difficult posting . There is intense pressure on mission officials who are engaged in a constant war of wits with Pakistani intelligence out to subvert and compromise Indian diplomats and staffers, if only to prove a point. “We know there will be subversion so we have to be on the ball all the time,’’ said a retired foreign service officer.
Intelligence officers, whether from R&AW or IB, probably have the toughest time. They are subjected to hoax calls, terrorised on the roads by vehicles threatening to mow them down and traumatised by obscene gestures. And when Indo-Pak relations dip, they are used for target practice. The most famous case occurred in May 1992 when Rajesh Mittal, a R&AW officer posted as counsellor in the high commission , was kidnapped and tortured for eight hours by Pakistani intelligence. Indian diplomats who went to pick him up when he was finally released were shocked to see his state. He had been beaten, given electric shocks and could neither walk nor talk.
It’s ironic that Pakistani authorities know exactly which diplomats are intelligence officers and which ones are career diplomats. This is one of the best kept secrets in diplomacy all over the world. Every country posts intelligence officials in sensitive missions and the host nation almost always knows their identities but turns a blind eye. It’s one of those unwritten agreements. It is, therefore, easy for Pakistani intelligence to pick on its Indian counterparts in the high commission. Their vulnerability makes them soft targets and it becomes the responsibility of the head of mission and his deputy, usually foreign service officers, to exercise due diligence and protect them.
Unfortunately, this doesn’t always happen. Foreign office circles still talk about the battle that shook our mission in Nepal some years ago between the ambassador and the R&AW station head. They just didn’t get on and both made frequent trips to Delhi to accuse each other of financial irregularities. In the process, recalls a diplomat, intelligence work in Nepal, which is a key operational centre, suffered. “We failed to see the rise of the Maoists,’’ said the diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Although Indira Gandhi created R&AW in 1968 with the idea of developing external intelligence expertise to safeguard India’s strategic interests, the agency has failed to mature into an institutionalised system. Nor has it integrated well with the foreign service whose diplomats often look down on R&AW officers. The line of command within a mission outside India depends entirely on the chemistry between the R&AW official and the ambassador.
At home too, the relationship between R&AW and IB has never been clearly worked out. Both report to different political masters. R&AW comes under the cabinet secretariat which is the prime minister’s domain while IB is under the home minister. There is intense rivalry between the two, which sometimes leads to bizarre situations such as the publicity blitz that blew the lid off the Madhuri Gupta spy case.
Retired intelligence officials lament that not enough attention has been paid to building up the two agencies that are responsible for helping the government to protect and preserve national security and integrity. For instance, R&AW doesn’t have a dedicated cadre even today. Its officers are drawn haphazardly from the police service, posts and telegraphs service, railways and other completely unrelated organisations. “Without proper training, these people may never understand the delicate nature of intelligence work or the nuances of international politics,’’ said one official.
As India’s international profile grows, there is a crying need for specialised intelligence gathering and upgrading the security of missions abroad and their personnel. But more urgent is the need to instill a sense of discipline so that the sensitive nature of intelligence work is not compromised.
Honey traps will be laid again and again. In the last few years, the government has had to withdraw an IFS officer and a R&AW man from China after they got involved with women suspected of being Chinese intelligence agents. “Moles, traitors, honey traps are all par for the course,’’ said Sood. “These things happen in every country.” They do, of course. Just that most nations don’t talk about it.
arati.jerath@timesgroup .com