2021 — the year of Quads and keeping China in the crosshairs

It was the year for bite-sized multilateralism. In the midst of a torrid second wave, particularly India, the Indian foreign policy had to adjust to a “new, new normal” in global geopolitics.The Quad — a group of like-minded democracies — came into its own, providing geopolitics watchers with an “inflexion point” in contemporary international relations. The first Quad leadership meeting was held virtually in March, which also set the direction for the grouping — vaccines to combat Covid and a look at critical emerging technologies and climate change. The first in-person summit in September sealed the deal among the four, bringing attention to infrastructure, 5G, cybersecurity and education — the primary concerns of the 21st century.Contrary to popular belief, AUKUS (a defence partnership between US, UK and Australia to supply nuclear submarines to Australia) was quietly welcomed by India (and even Japan). In fact, as US’ Indo-Pacific czar, Kurt Campbell observed recently, close partners may even join because… well, China.China factorChinese troops have not only remained on the LAC in eastern Ladakh, but also in threatening positions in eastern Himalayas in Arunachal Pradesh. Despite two disengagement agreements with India, the country has also beefed up its military infrastructure on the LAC in a way that forces India to commit more troops, weapons and surveillance.medium nocaption88572020India is willy-nilly drawn into the US-China great power competition, which has necessitated so many of India’s diplomatic moves in the past year and will continue to do so in 2022. That apart, the fact that China effectively tore up border agreements of 30 years means Beijing is playing a bigger game against India that could, if India is not vigilant and proactive enough, continue to tie it down at its borders, both on the Chinese and Pakistani fronts. This realisation is enforced with foreign minister S Jaishankar and defence minister Rajnath Singh’s frequent flagging of continued Chinese threat.There’s no denying that Xi Jinping is also playing a high stakes and complex game — he wants to change the nature of the Chinese economy and its strategic positioning. This includes his rolling crackdowns on tech, finance, education, entertainment and real estate sectors (as well as most of his political rivals or threats). Not to mention, an aggressive and expansionist external posture in the South China Sea, against India, Japan and Australia and a burgeoning confrontation with the US and the West.It has led to India beginning a process of diversification and decoupling from China that could take a few years to achieve. China’s early losses in India are several — the Indian tech sector is effectively closed to Chinese investment. India has kept China out of the 5G telecom services until early 2020. China had a good chance of getting its foot in the door. China will also never win a war against India, even though it can wound the country deeply. But most importantly, China has lost trust and credibility in India.medium nocaption88572026Both in 2020 and 2021, China engaged in the kind of usurious price gouging and supply destabilisation that led India, Australia and Japan to start a smaller grouping to build resilient supply chains. This initiative is likely to be absorbed into the larger Quad, but the idea remains the same — trusted, small networks, shorter supply chains and investment and trade linked to these chains. Most of them keep China out or in areas where it can be easily replaced.New friendsIndia has been looking west with greater interest in the past few years. It has built close ties with the Arab Gulf and Israel while retaining its civilisational ties with Iran. Therefore, it seemed natural to build the second Quad in West Asia — Israel, India, UAE and the US came together to build digital and physical infrastructure, maritime security and technology.As a matter of fact, the only meaningful grouping that crumbled was a promising India-France-Australia trilateral that fell to the clumsiness of AUKUS. However, 2022 may see India and France cooperating with the UAE as the definition of Indo-Pacific broadens to beyond the western Indian Ocean.The broad idea seems to be this: By putting a political/strategic value to technology and infrastructure, these plurilateral arrangements are building alternatives to authoritarian China.medium nocaption88572043Interestingly, this year also saw India as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. In August India piloted UNSC Resolution 2593, which provides the benchmarks for engaging the Taliban emirate in Afghanistan. Yet, in December, India had to fall back on a Russian veto to prevent the Western world from securitising climate change issues. It brought home India’s powerlessness in a multilateral world government by yesteryear rules. But the situation isn’t likely to change any time soon, so plurilateralism and minilaterals will rule India’s diplomatic engagement.Closer homeThe most recent one is the Indian focus on Central Asia as a result of the recent developments in Afghanistan. The Delhi Security Dialogue, and the India-Central Asia Dialogue, brought all the Central Asian countries, including Russia, to India, to share common concerns about the Taliban, IS and Afghanistan. That they would all come to Delhi speaks about their concerns, not only about Afghanistan, but also Pakistan.It's also another way of keeping a focus on Afghanistan, but without allowing either Pakistan or China to have a veto. Russia, which was playing on the Chinese side, is willing to look at the India-led option. After all, the central Asian states may have been born out of the USSR, but they are happy hunting grounds for Chinese influence-peddling. India has cultural and political traction in this region and two decades of solid development work in Afghanistan. This year was about clawing back space, leverage and influence. 2022 should yield results.