Still a long, weary road to disarmament

In 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had co-sponsored a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly, calling for a "standstill agreement" on all nuclear testing. Nehru saw the cessation of nuclear testing as a stepping stone to universal nuclear disarmament. But, during the Cold War, attempts to bring nuclear tests to a close proved futile.The nuclear-weapon states carried out a plethora of tests to ensure the reliability and viability of their respective nuclear stockpiles.
More than half-a-decade after the Cold War's end, a draft of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally voted on at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). That was in 1996 and it received overwhelming support. But for a variety of complex domestic policy concerns, the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty; it is yet to come into force. India, which had significant reservations about the draft treaty, voted against it in the UNGA.
In the light of President Obama's call to rid the world of nuclear weapons, the signing of a new arms control agreement with Russia, his convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, last month and the upcoming review of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) this month, there is little question that the United States will again issue a renewed call to implement the CTBT. In all likelihood, President Obama will argue that signing the CTBT is a useful first step toward the elusive goal of global nuclear disarmament.
One faction of India's security and foreign policy establishment still has a Nehruvian outlook on global nuclear disarmament. They regard these weapons of mass destruction with abhorrence. But, other than alluding to the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan on 1988, they have proffered few clear-cut roadmaps to nuclear disarmament. Nor do they seem to recognize that a plan that sets fixed timetables to rid the world of nuclear weapons is almost bound to fail. Negotiations on an issue this momentous and as complex cannot be shoehorned into a pre-determined time frame. Consequently, the plan evoked little interest when it was presented and has not gathered traction despite dramatic changes in global politics.
Another segment of India's security policy and foreign establishment makes the case for universal nuclear disarmament on more pragmatic grounds. It contends that universal nuclear disarmament would actually serve India's strategic and national security interests. At first blush such an argument sounds chimerical. However, it is possible to envisage how a genuinely nuclear weapons-free world might enhance India's national security interests. If, for example, both of India's fractious neighbours, China and Pakistan, were compelled to divest themselves of nuclear weapons, India could surely deter aggression from either state through robust conventional capabilities.
The second group also needs to go beyond the usual platitudes about the strategic benefits for India as a consequence of nuclear disarmament. It needs to focus on a set of key questions. At the outset, it must spell out how India will guarantee its legitimate security interests as it and the rest of the world moves toward a reduction of nuclear stockpiles. Already, there is a vigorous debate underway about the reliability of India's weapons designs. Can India, during this period of transition, rely on its existing nuclear stockpile without further tests?
This is not an issue where mere public statements about the efficacy of the five nuclear tests of May 1998 will suffice. Those who genuinely believe that the tests were efficacious and sufficient for a robust deterrent need to re-affirm, through appropriate scientific data, that their claims are beyond question. This will not be easy because of legitimate questions of national security.
But they will also have to tackle the question of an end to the production of fissile material. This, because the accession to a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is yet another step towards the same goal. Finally, they will have to contend with the most contentious question: adequate verification of the destruction of nuclear stockpiles. Until these contentious but vital issues are addressed, the goal of disarmament will remain as elusive as ever.
Sumit Ganguly is the Ngee Ann Professor of International Relations at the Rajaratnam School for International Studies, Singapore