It's time for army-ISI to feel the heat

It has been the Pakistan army and ISI's good fortune that the US has needed their support at precisely those periods when their actions ought to have earned international condemnation. The activities of A Q Khan through the 1980s, widely thought to have had army and ISI support, was well known to US but tolerated because of Pakistan's importance as the front-line state in the Soviet-Afghan war.In the post-9/11 era Pakistan's support for terrorist groups and its provision of a territorial sanctuary for the Taliban have been overlooked because of the importance of the Pakistan army and ISI, and of Pakistan geo-strategically, in the hunt for the al-Qaeda leadership and the war in Afghanistan.
Thus the Bush administration gave more than $10 billion to the Pakistan army between 2001 and 2008, with virtually no accountability either in Washington or Islamabad. Much of this money has been diverted to expand the Pakistan army's economic activities and to buy weapons of relevance primarily to the rivalry with India. Despite this, the US continued to prop up Pervez Musharraf long after the Pakistan people had lost confidence in him.
In 2009 the situation for the Pakistan Army and ISI is going to get a great deal more uncomfortable. In the post-Musharraf era, there was a moment of hope that Gen Ashfaq Kiyani would steer the army and the ISI in a genuine pro-Western direction, end support for terrorism, subordinate the army and ISI to greater political control, and join the US and NATO in a decisive confrontation with the Taliban. By the summer of 2008 it was clear that none of these were going to happen. The attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008, which was linked to the ISI through the Haqqani network, crystallized two issues for the US administration: firstly that Pakistan was going to continue to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy, and secondly that under Kiyani, no meaningful change was going to take place.
After the Kabul attack the US stepped up pressure on Pakistan agreeing a deal to escalate cross-border air-strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas. The US also conducted a ground assault on tribal militants on September 3 which was met by Pakistan army gunfire. It also prevailed on the Pakistan army to take the fight into the tribal areas to attempt to crush the Taliban. However, it is now evident that while the Pakistan army is pushing foreign fighters and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan out of these agencies, it has yet to turn its guns on Mullah Omar's Afghan Taliban or on its erstwhile proxies. The US now understands that this is because Pakistan still believes that the West will not stay the course in Afghanistan and that the Taliban cannot be defeated. Less sympathetic figures in Washington put the success of the Taliban in Afghanistan down to support from the Pakistan army.
The incoming Obama administration has already signalled a determination to get tough with Pakistan. Under Obama there will be a shift from military to non-military aid, and military aid to Pakistan will both be much reduced and subject to tough conditionality and accountability. The new administration also intends a troop surge in Afghanistan. This will not be possible without genuine support from Pakistan. Thus far it has been impossible for the US to maximise leverage on the Pakistan Army and ISI because of the US and NATO's dependence on Pakistan for supply lines and intelligence. In anticipation of this the US has recently announced new land-transit deals with Russia and the Central Asian states which will allow NATO to cut its logistics dependence on Pakistan. Thus the stage is being set for pressure on Pakistan army and ISI in 2009 to break their ties with terrorists.
In this context India has a highly significant role to play. Its policy must be to deny the Pakistan army and ISI the chance to play the India card. In this respect the measured response of India to the Mumbai outrages has been wholly correct. India must also act to strengthen Pakistan's democratically elected government wherever possible, which means the peace process and momentum on the Kashmir issue must not be lost. Finally, India should also reach out to the US both to assist in leveraging the pressure on the Pakistan Army and ISI, and to work with the US to provide assurance to Pakistan which can undercut the paranoia of the Pakistan Army and ISI, not least with respect to India's role in Afghanistan.
(The writer is director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit, Bradford University, UK)