Crossing the Rubicon

The civilian leadership must show the statecraft to clarify its red lines where the military is concerned.
Each time there is a major disagreement between a service chief and the government, the situation turns into a crisis and goes spiralling out of control. It happened in 1998 in the stand-off between defence minister George Fernandes and Navy chief Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat.It is happening again with the unsettling row that started with the date of birth controversy of army chief General V K Singh.
To the nation, such a spectacle is undoubtedly an embarrassment, while the media uses the opportunity to stir up the usual unresolved debate on how to handle civil-military relations in our country. Each time there are hardened views expressed on either side of the institutional divide, with public interest litigations that merely waste the judiciary’s time. At the end of the day, the outcome is never positive, as mistrust and suspicion remain while the gap in civil-military relations seems to widen.
Our basic approach to handling civil-military relations is flawed for two reasons. Firstly, we do not seem to accept the fact that a gap exists in civil-military relations. This is largely because the civilian leadership is not sensitised to military subculture and need to remember that a soldier is not just a civilian in uniform; he has a different ethos. Secondly, we still do not have an institutionalised framework for handling civil-military problems, and consequently neither side is aware of the limit to which a disagreement is acceptable.
In the absence of an institutionalised approach, the government has to place its faith in the defence minister who becomes the trouble-shooter for all occasions. In 1998 it was George Fernandes, and now it is A K Antony, with the final outcome left to their personal instincts and temperament. Bung-ling along in this manner, we remain unconcerned by the downstream effect on the rank and file of the armed forces.
It took the Indian Navy considerable time to recover from the aftershocks of the 1998 spat between the defence minister and the navy chief. But ironically, when the Kargil conflict erupted soon thereafter, the navy could boast of its battle readiness with a 100% war wastage reserve. The lesson that comes through is noteworthy yet paradoxical: strong military chiefs can be a great asset for national security but somehow they seem to make the government nervous.
It is apparent that somewhere deep within the system lurks an irrational phobia about the Indian military establishment posing a challenge to civilian authority. The situation has perhaps been compounded by the happenings in our neighbourhood. That in essence is the nature of the problem that is central to civil-military relations in our country.
Quite clearly, it behoves the civilian leadership to come to grips with this problem and aim to establish civilian control that serves both sides. Towards this end, a set of guiding principles needs to be formulated along with rules that are clearly defined.
Although the contours of civil-military relations vary with every country, the problem is universal. It would therefore be useful to draw on the experience of others, and in particular, from democratic nations that maintain large armed forces. The lessons learnt by others could be suitably factored into our system.
Bearing in mind that the armed forces are primarily configured for war, experts are of the view that sound relations between the civil and military establishments are most likely to be found in countries where the military remains focussed and engaged in countering a clear-cut external threat. There is also a view that diverting frontline security forces from their core mission degrades their psyche and professional calibre, particularly when the deployment is for large-scale internal security tasks of a prolonged duration.
This is perhaps the most significant factor to be considered in our context, since India faces a dual challenge; inimical neighbours to contend with and a growing insurgency within our borders. Handling civil-military relations in India can be a complex task, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act controversy being a case in point.
The ultimate need is to induce confidence in the civil-military relationship and create an environment of trust, which at present seems to be lacking notwithstanding the overtures that are sometimes made.
While defining the norms for professional military conduct, the most difficult task before the civilian leadership is to boldly delineate the line that must never be crossed. This is an extremely sensitive issue that calls for astute statecraft but needs to be squarely addressed.
Historically, it is a concept that goes back to the days of ancient Rome when it became necessary to ensure the unity of the vast Roman empire. The democratically elected senate declared the river Rubicon that borders the city of Rome, as the sacred line that was never to be crossed by any military governor of an outlying province.
In 49 BC, ambition got the better of Julius Caesar and he crossed the Rubicon and entered Rome with his army. The tragic consequences that followed were dramatically portrayed in William Shakespeare’s masterpiece. Even then it was an Antony who made his mark.
It is one thing for the rank and file to seek legal recourse but it is quite another matter for a serving chief of the Indian armed forces to take up cudgels against the Union of India. That may be crossing the Rubicon.
The writer is a former naval chief.