Could Pahalgam happen again?

On 22 April 2025, India was shaken by the dastardly murder of 26 innocent civilians. Various response options were deliberated and simultaneously higher levels of operational readiness were affected to prevent uncontrolled escalation. Operation Sindoor, launched a fortnight later, was a demonstration of decisive leadership backed by a capable military.

If the Pakistan army was guided by reason and national interest, it would desist from sponsoring such terrorist acts in future — for the sake of its people. But history warns otherwise; vested interests of the Pakistan army, and its need to remain politically central, have repeatedly driven it to choose confrontation over conciliation.




Pakistan’s founding myth has long rested on an anti-In-dia narrative, and that narrative has been cultivated across generations and institutions. Crucially, the army seized power early and has never fully relinquished it. Even when civilian faces occupy the corridors of power, the military ensures they remain pliant. Strong political figures who challenged that dominance have been removed — the Bhuttos paid with their blood, and Imran Khan has been jailed.

Will the Pakistan army undertake another misadventure akin to Pahalgam? On the face of it, the Pakistan army looks unassailable — confident at home and courted abroad. Its field marshal enjoys the confidence of the world’s most powerful political executive. It has basked in global attention by hosting peace talks between the US and Iran.

Shorn of ideology, the Pakistan army can pivot for profit, dictating terms to a pliant civilian govt and taking decisions without any accountability. The aftermath of Operation Sindoor too has been smoothed over with deft narrative management, leaving the Pakistan army comfortably ensconced. What could pos-sibly go wrong for it? Plenty.

First, Pakistan’s economic condition is dire. Any fresh crisis, such as current turmoil in the Gulf, will only worsen the precarious situation, fuelling unrest among the populace.

Second, the Afghan border remains volatile. The conflict with Baloch National Army is intensifying, and indiscrimi-nate airstrikes on civilians have deepened resentment. Tehrike-Taliban Pakistan continues to strike with impunity, while attacks on Kabul by the Pakistan air force have further strained relations with the Afghan govt, leaving little room for manoeuvre.

Third, the Imran Khan factor. Though seemingly dormant, his party, PTI, retains mass popularity. Denied victory through the Army’s machinations, his supporters may again take to the streets, challenging the Army’s supposed infallibility.

Finally, the snakes reared in its own backyard — the terrorist tanzeems nurtured to bleed India — may turn inward when deprived of patronage, biting the very hand that feeds them.

Beneath the veneer of strength of the Pakistan ar-my lies its fragility. Any of the scenarios outlined would call into question its claim to be the sole arbiter of Pakistan’s national interest and would undermine its standing.

That perceived erosion of authority could prompt the army to sponsor a grave terror strike in India — an act designed to invite a punitive Indian response and there by thrust the Pakistan army back into the national spotlight, restoring its relevance.

If such an attack occurs, Pakistan would face far harsher consequences than before; its people would suffer grievously. But for the self-serving generals, national pain may be an acceptable price if it secures the Pakistan army’s return to primacy. Will Pahalgam happen again? The answer perhaps lies with the Pakistan army.

(The writer was Western Army Commander during the Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor)