MADURAI: Madurai bench of Madras high court dismissed an appeal of a woman who sought adverse possession of a property. The appellant Krishnaveni owns a property and in 1989, Alamelu Mangai and Krishnaveni entered into a sale agreement in respect of the property. The sale price was fixed at Rs 62,000 and Alamelu paid Rs 46,500 as advance. As per the agreement, the remaining amount should be paid by September 16, 1989.
As the balance amount was not paid, Alamelu filed a petition before the lower court in 1992 stating that the Krishnaveni failed to execute the sale deed.
The court which dismissed the suit directed Krishnaveni to pay the advance amount Rs 46,500 along with 6% interest to Alamelu.
As per the direction of the trial court, Krishnaveni deposited the advance amount with interest before the trial court. Since Alamelu refused to hand over the possession of the property, Krishnaveni filed an execution petition in 2011. However, it was dismissed. Hence, Krishnaveni filed a suit seeking recovery of possession.
Even though Alamelu contended that Krishnaveni had sent a notice on September 15, 1989 regarding cancelation of sale agreement, she should have filed the suit for recovery of possession within 12 years. She further contended that since the suit has barred by limitation, she was entitled to adverse possession. However, the court directed Alamelu to vacate the property within two months.
Subsequently, Alamelu moved an appeal and the first appellate court dismissed the petition. Subsequently she filed a second appeal before the HC Madurai bench in 2017.
Justice J Nisha Banu observed that as per Section 65 of Limitation Act, the period of limitation of 12 years commences when the possession of the defendant becomes adversse to the plaintiff.
“According to Alamelu, the adverse possession commences from September 15 1989, the date on which Krishnaveni has issued legal notice cancelling the sale agreement. But the fact remains that subsequently, Alamelu filed a suit in 1992 based on the notice and thereafter filed the first and second appeal.
“Since Alamelu initiated earlier round of litigation for specific performance in order to fortify her possession over the property, this court is of the view that her possession cannot be termed as adverse possession. Thus, the period spent in the earlier proceedings can be excluded,” observed the judge.
Hence, the judge dismissed the second appeal of Alamelu observing that this court does not find any reason to interfere with the order of the first appellate court.