Hyderabad: What was planned as one of the largest Maoist strikes in recent years — a coordinated assault by nearly 400 armed cadres on the Dharmaram CRPF camp — ultimately unravelled into a night of confusion, technical failures and missed objectives, according to surrendered PLGA battalion commander Badise Sukka alias Deva.
The attack on the night of Jan 16-17, 2024, was conceived as a full-scale siege. Maoist leadership mobilised four companies, backed by extensive planning, rehearsals and a structured command chain. But as Deva's interrogation disclosures reveal, the operation began collapsing piece by piece — not because of a single decisive counter-move, but due to a cascade of failures in execution, equipment and battlefield coordination.
Within Maoist ranks, the setback was later described as a ‘partial success', yet the reconstruction of events paints a starkly different picture: An assault that lost momentum early and gradually slid into retreat.
Meticulously planned
The strike was led by a senior command team. Slain leader Madavi Hiduma alias Hidma, a central committee member, served as raid commander, coordinating teams through VHF radio from the headquarters company. Company commanders included Sodi Keshal (first company), Badise Sukka (second), Muchaki Erral (third) and Jailal (HQ company).
Cadres drawn from the PLGA battalion, Telangana state committee and district units assembled in the Palaguda forest with rations and military supplies meant to last a month. Weapons were serviced between Jan 4 and 8, while IED components were dried and prepared. From Jan 9 to 13, teams rehearsed repeatedly using a mock-up of the Dharmaram camp to familiarise themselves with the terrain and attack roles.
On Jan 16, the assault teams left their administrative base at 3.30 pm and reached concealed positions around the camp by evening. At about 7 pm, Hiduma ordered the advance, opening the attack with shelling.
A key objective was breaching the camp perimeter. A team led by first platoon commander Karatam Deva attempted to cut the fencing and force entry. Security forces, however, were already alert and responded with heavy fire. Karatam was killed, and the team withdrew — a loss that removed a crucial field leader and stalled the push to turn bombardment into an actual siege.
Deva's account offers a rare inside view of how a heavily planned insurgent operation can unravel under real battlefield conditions, where logistics, technology, leadership losses and rapid counter-measures can decisively reshape the outcome within hours.
Turning point
According to Deva, the arrival of a mine-protected vehicle (MPV) from the nearby Chintavagu camp around 11.30 pm transformed the battle.
The Maoist plan had included isolating Dharmaram by destroying the Chintavagu bridge with IEDs to prevent reinforcements. But the explosives never detonated. Trigger wires laid for the blast were reportedly severed when shells fired by Maoist teams themselves landed on them. The bridge remained intact, allowing the MPV to cross.
Once inside, the vehicle gave security forces both mobility and protection. It served as a moving shield, enabling troops to advance and launch grenades at Maoist positions. Deva's account says drones were also deployed to locate cadres, after which targeted fire and grenades were directed at those positions from behind the MPV's protection. Security forces simultaneously responded with sustained shelling from within and around the camp.
What had been planned as a tight encirclement began slipping beyond the attackers' control.
Equipment failures
A second wave of setbacks came from within the Maoist ranks. Weapons malfunctioned, ammunition began running low and improvised systems failed to perform despite days of preparation.
One major blow involved a weapon known as the ‘demolisher.' A party member identified as Vikram was killed when it misfired during the assault. Combined with the earlier death of Karatam, the incident further eroded morale. Despite repeated attempts by Hidma and other leaders to rally cadres, effective counter-fire proved difficult once security forces gained the advantage.
By around 1 am on Jan 17, the operation had clearly faltered. Hidma ordered a full withdrawal. Units collected their dead and wounded and retreated towards a rendezvous point near Udathamalla village.
The incident remains under investigation. In June 2025, the National Investigation Agency filed a chargesheet against 17 accused — 16 of them absconding — in connection with the attack.
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