BJP’s Bengal Job

Bengal’s long and grim tradition of post-poll violence is on display again. The murder of BJP leader Suvendu Adhikari’s personal assistant, shot dead by bike-borne assailants in Madhyamgram, is the darkest shadow so far. Across the state, incidents of arson and vandalism targeted Trinamool offices in Kolkata, Howrah, Asansol, Siliguri and Baruipur. In Birbhum, a Trinamool worker was hacked to death; in Howrah, a BJP activist was lynched. The familiar machinery of political terror has begun to whirr again.

Yet, by Bengal’s own troubling standards, this election has seen comparatively less violence. A major reason has been the unprecedented deployment of central security forces, whose presence clearly acted as a deterrent in several sensitive areas. But reduced violence cannot be mistaken for normalcy. The incoming govt cannot afford complacency, because Bengal’s electorate has signalled exhaustion with precisely this culture of intimidation and bloodletting.

Political violence in Bengal did not begin with the current dispensation. Congress govts presided over it, Left Front institutionalised it, and Trinamool inherited and refined the system. During Mamata Banerjee’s early years in power, the phrase “Lal-Trinamool” entered Bengal’s political vocabulary, to describe local Left strongmen, who seamlessly shifted loyalties to the then governing party. Ideology changed; muscle power remained. Over decades, this ecosystem of patronage, extortion, and territorial dominance hollowed out democratic culture in the state.

That is why any promise of “poriborton” cannot remain a slogan. If BJP intends to present itself as an alternative, it must first ensure that revenge attacks by its own supporters are stopped immediately. Swift action against those involved in retaliatory violence is essential, not only to restore order, but also to establish the moral authority needed to act against criminal elements across party lines. Bengal has suffered too long under the syndicate raj, and the localised reign of political strongmen, who control contracts and access to basic civic life.

Stakes are even higher because this election witnessed intense religious polarisation. In Bengal, the distance between political violence and communal violence can become dangerously short. Given Bangladesh’s internal instability and concerns over growing extremist networks in the region, any communal flare-up would carry consequences far beyond state politics. Bengal’s voters have delivered a clear message: they want an end to violence as a political language. The next govt must finally break that cycle, before today’s embers become tomorrow’s inferno.